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CAN FAITH BE JUSTIFIED? 
N.K. Verbin 
In this paper, I argue for a new conception of religious justifications which takes 
the perfonnance of miracles as the paradigm of reasoning in religion. The paper 
has two parts: In the first part, I argue against Swinburne's parity argument for 
the existence of God by showing that religious perceptions fit more comfortably 
among aspect perceptions, e.g., the perceptions of beauty and courage, th,m 
among our perceptions of objects and colors. While one can be said to believe 
that a certain object is red solely on the basis of someone else's testimony, one 
cannot be said to believe that a certain object is beautiful solely on the basis of 
someone else's testimony. In order to believe that a certain object is beautiful, 
one has to see its beauty for oneself. Similarly, as a matter of logic, one cmmot be 
said to believe that God exists solely on the basis of someone else's testimony. 
Believing in God necessarily involves seeing God for oneself. In the second part 
of the paper I employ the analogy between seeing Cod and seeing beauty and 
the moral features of an act to propose a perfonnative and transformative con-
ception of religious reasoning. I argue that an argument in religion is a perfor-
mance which brings various facts or events into life in a particular manner, so 
that God may be seen in or through them. Any such performance through 
which God is seen may be properly called a "miracle". Thus, the performance of 
miracles, i.e., of acts that are directed at becoming the vehicles through which 
Cod is seen, can be taken as the paradigm of religious reasoning. 
A popular line of defense of the rationality of theism employs a proposed 
analogy between religious experiences and sense perceptions, arguing that 
we have no more right to affirm the epistemic status of perceptual beliefs, 
beliefs based on sense perception, than we have of religious beliefs that are 
based on religious experiences. Yandell, for example states: "If there is 
experiential evidence for any existential proposition, perceptual experi-
ences provide evidence that there are physical objects; it is arbitrary not to 
add that perceptual experience provides evidence that God exists ... ".1 
Other philosophers express similar views: Alston affirms a Christian 
Mystical doxastic practice as standing on an equal footing with a Sense 
Perceptual doxastic practice; and Swinburne formulates a Principle of 
Credulity, which is presumed to apply to both religious experiences and 
sense perceptions, affirming the epistemic status of both. 
The purpose of this paper is to point to some of the inadequacies of such 
attempted justifications by highlighting some of the differences between 
religious experiences and sense perceptions, and to use those differences to 
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construe a new conception of the justification of religious beliefs, which 
takes the performance of miracles as the paradigm of reasoning in religion. 
This paper has two parts: In the first part, I argue against an influential 
argument from religious experience, namely Swinburne's analogical argu-
ment as he develops it in The Existence of God. In the second part, I propose 
a new conception of justification that starts with the disanalogy between 
religious perceptions and sense perceptions, and that draws on the analogy 
between religious beliefs and ethical and aesthetic judgments to argue that 
the paradigm of reasoning in religion is the performance of miracles. 
1. Swinburne's Principle of Credulity 
In The Existence of God, Swinburne formulates a Principle of Credulity that 
is presumed to apply to both religious experiences and sense perceptions: 
It is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of special considera-
tions) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present, then 
probably x is present; what one seems to perceive is probably so. 
How things seem to be is good grounds for a belief about how things 
are. From this it wou ld follow that, in the absence of special consider-
ations, all religious experiences ought to be taken by their subjects as 
genuine, and hence as substantial grounds for belief in the existence 
of their apparent object-God, or Mary, or Ultimate Reality, or 
Poseidon. This principle, which I shall call the Principle of Credulity, 
and the conclusion drawn from it seems to me correct? 
Swinburne explicates the above definition in two different ways: (1) He 
explicates it in terms of a principle that is "concerned with the subject's 
grounds for believing that things are as they seem to him."3 He argues: 
/lOne who has had a religious experience apparently of God has, by the 
Principle of Credulity, good reason for believing that there is a God-other 
things being equal---especially if it is a forceful experience."" 
As a principle that is concerned with the subject's epistemic right to 
trust her own perceptions, it can, at best, vindicate the mystic's epistemic 
right to trust her own perceptions of God; nevertheless, it says nothing 
concerning the epistemic duties or rights of those who have no religious 
experiences. If one seeks to provide a justification of religious beliefs that is 
directed beyond those who are already convinced, she has to go beyond a 
vindication of the epistemic status of the perceiver's own perceptions. 
(2) Thus, we find a second explication of the Principle of Credulity in The 
Existence of God which is stated in relation to the manner in which things 
appear to others: "thing are (probably) as others claim to have perceived 
them."s This claim consists of two components: (a) The claim that "(in the 
absence of special considerations) the experiences of others are (probably) 
as they report them,"6 which is Swinburne's Principle of Testimony, and (b) 
The claim that in the absence of special considerations, "how things seem to 
be is good grounds for a belief about how things are."? 
For Swinburne, religious experiences playa central epistemic role both 
for those who have had them as well as for those who have not. 
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Swinburne states: 
If S reports that it seems (epistemically) to S that x is present, then 
that is reason for others also to believe that x is present, although not 
as good reason as it is for S ... 8 
Thus: 
One who has not himself had an experience apparently of God is not 
in as strong a position as those who have. He will have less evidence 
for the existence of God; but not very much less, for he will have testi-
mony of many who have had such experiences.9 
I have no quarrel with Swinburne's first explication of the Principle of 
Credulity, in terms of the subject's epistemic right to trust her own percep-
tions.h ) However, I find Swinburne's second explication of the Principle of 
Credulity, in terms of the reliability of perceptual testimonies, as applied to 
religious experiences, highly problematic. 
The reliability of our perception is ordinarily taken for granted in our life 
with physical objects. We sit on what seems to be a chair, write on what 
seems to be a piece of paper, and hand out bills to what seems to be a shop-
keeper. When asked questions about our environment, we describe it as we 
perceive it, and appeal to our perceptions as grounds for our judgments. 
Testimonies, too, playa great role in our doxastic life. Had we not taken tes-
timony as a reliable method of belief formation, our doxastic universe 
would have been significantly impoverished. Under normal conditions, 
when a person responds to the question, "How do you know that Bill's eyes 
are blue?" by saying "I saw them", not only do we believe that she has a 
right to claim knowledge of the color of Bill's eyes, but we also form the 
same belief on the basis of her testimony that Bill's eyes are blue. The ques-
tion, however, is whether such principles have the general form that 
Swinburne takes them to have, or whether their extension is more limited. I 
shall argue that while the reliability of perception can be taken as a general 
principle of rationality, the reliability of perceptual testimony cannot be 
taken as such a general principle since it does not extend to perceptions of 
aspects, e.g., to perceptions of beauty, sadness, courage, or God. I shall 
argue that perceptua I testimony is not a reliable method of belief formation 
since in various circumstances it is not a method of belief formation at all. 
Swinburne is operating with an analogy between perceptions of physi-
cal objects and perceptions of God. In the absence of special considerations, 
a perceptual testimony to have seen a table in a particular place serves as a 
reason for the non-perceiver to believe that a table was present in a particu-
lar place; similarly, in the absence of special considerations, the mystic's 
testimony to have perceived God is presumed to serve as a reason for the 
atheist to believe that God existsY 
Do we know of anyone who was converted to faith by means of her 
hearing of another person's religious experience? The absence of such 
occurrences, in itself, provides us with a good reason to suspect that there 
are important conceptual differences between seeing a table, seeing a shape, 
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or a color, and seeing-God, and hence between believing that there is a table 
of a particular color and shape in a particular location and believing that 
God exists. lf there are indeed such differences then we may surely expect 
significant differences between the manner in which religious beliefs can be 
justified and the manner in which ordinary perceptual beliefs can. 
Thus, I shall argue that while one can be justified in trusting one's own 
perception of God, as well as one's own perception of the beauty of an 
object, or the courage or rightness of a certain act, one cmmot be justified in 
trusting another person's testimony of her perception of courage, beauty, 
or God. One cannot, as a matter of logic, form certain beliefs merely by 
means of a testimony. Believing that x is beautiful, that y is the right thing 
to do, or that God exists involve seeing for oneself. 
Seeing and Seeing-as 
Realizing that our concept of perception is a "family resemblance" concept 
that encapsulates a variety of phenomena with diverse conceptual features, 
the later Wittgenstein distinguished two uses of "see": 
Two cases of the word 'see'. The one: 'What do you see there?'-'I see 
this' (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: 'I see a 
likeness between these two faces'-let the man I tell this to be seeing 
the faces as clearly as I do myself. (PI, p. 193).'2 
In various remarks, Wittgenstein emphasized "the difference of catego-
ry between the two 'objects' of sight" (PI, p. 193), characterizing phenome-
na belonging to the second group as half experience, half thoughe3, an 
amalgam of the twd4, between perceiving and thinking!5. Among such 
phenomena are seeing a picture as a picture of a duck, a rabbit or a duck-
rabbit, perceiving one's intention, hearing sadness, seeing courage, seeing 
beauty, and many others. Wittgenstein called such perceptual phenomena 
"seeing-as" phenomena or "aspect perceptions". 
I cannot undertake the important task of providing a detailed typology 
of various perceptual phenomena and their diverse conceptual features 
here.16 I shall make a few brief comments that are intended to gesture at the 
great diversity of conceptual features that characterize different phenome-
na that fall under the concept of "perception". Awareness of the diversity, 
or at least of its possibility should lead us to exercise caution when dealing 
with the epistemic status of perceptual testimonies. 
There is a great deal of disagreement among commentators as to the 
precise scope of seeing-as phenomena in Wittgenstein's writings. Some, 
such as Mulhall, take a broad reading of Wittgenstein's comments, where 
seeing aspects extends beyond our relation to ambiguous pictures, to our 
relation to pictures in general, as well as to words and to people.17 Others 
take a more restrictive reading of Wittgenstein's views. 18 What was impor-
tant for Wittgenstein and what is important for us is not how we apply one 
title or another, but rather, that we are aware of the variety of conceptual 
features that characterise the variety of phenomena that we call "seeing" or 
"perceiving". However we choose to name the different groups of phe-
nomena and where exactly we choose to draw the boundaries among them 
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is largely inconsequentiaL 
One important feature that distinguishes different perceptual phenome-
na from one another is the role of a conceptual scheme, of language and a 
particular type of training and education in some perceptions but not in 
others. On that score, we can distinguish the perception of objects and col-
ors from the perception of beauty, courage and God. While the perception 
of objects and colors does not presuppose the mastery of a language and is, 
therefore, naturally applied to animals, the perceptions of courage, beauty 
and God presuppose the mastery of a language, and are therefore restrict-
ed to people who master the relevant conceptual scheme. While we 
describe dogs as seeing other dogs, cats, and birds, we do not ordinarily 
describe them as hearing the beauty of a sonata, nor do we describe them 
as perceiving the courage in an act. The role of a conceptual scheme, of cul-
ture, and of a particular type of education within such perceptions reveals 
the manners in which such phenomena incorporate a different although 
related conception of II experience". 
Perceiving God, whether through a mystical union, or in the more ordi-
nary experience of seeing God in the beauty of the universe is an experi-
ence which presupposes a complex conceptual scheme, a particular type of 
training and education. As such, it is not applied to animals nor is it 
applied to little children before they speak. Neither dogs nor babies are 
ordinarily reported as having mystical experiences. 
In respect to the role of language, training, and education in our ability 
to see God, religious perceptions fit better among perceptions of beauty 
and courage than among perceptions of objects and colors. In various other 
respects too, religious perceptions fit better among the former than among 
the latter. 
The perception of objects and colors is not subject to the will. The per-
ception of various aspects, e.g., beauty and courage, on the other hand, is 
subject to the wilL Wittgenstein states: 
An aspect is subject to the will. If something appears blue to me, I 
cannot see it red, and it makes no sense to say 'See it red'; whereas it 
does make sense to say 'See it as ... '. And that the aspect is voluntary 
(at least to a certain extent) seems to be essential to it, as it is essential 
to imagining that it is voluntary" (RPP I, 899). 
An aspect's subjection to the will does not entail that the command "See it 
as ... " can always be successfully obeyed. What it does entail, however, is 
that the command is always a meaningful one. 
Like the perceptions of beauty and courage, a central category of reli-
gious perceptions is also subject to the wilL While we cannot meaningfully 
ask one to try to see the tree as blue rather than green, we can meaningful-
ly ask "Try to see his laughter as courageous rather than as cowardly", 
"Try to see her wrinkles as beautiful rather than as ugly" and 'Try to see 
the heavens as telling the glory of God," "Try to see it as God's will." 
Unlike the agreement that characterizes our perceptions of objects and 
of colors, our perception of courage, beauty, and God is characterized by a 
great deal of disagreement. Disputes over the color of an object or over the 
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question whether it is a cat or a dog do not endure. Disputes in ethics, aes-
thetics and religion, on the other hand, endure. Where one person sees 
beauty, another sees kitsch; where one sees courage, another sees careless-
ness; where one sees God, another sees a metaphysical crutch, a supersti-
tion, a happenstance. 
Noticing the conceptual diversity within our concept of perception 
should lead us to exercise caution when dealing with the epistemic status of 
perceptual testimonies. We cannot throw all perceptual testimonies to one 
basket and assume that they all exhibit similar epistemic features. There is no 
reason to assume that one's testimony to have seen an ordinary object of per-
ception would carry equal or similar epistemic weight as her testimony to 
have seen an aspect. There is no reason to assume that one's testimony to 
have seen a black man would carry similar epistemic weight as her testimo-
ny to have seen a beautiful man; nor is there reason to assume that one's tes-
timony to have seen a chair would carry similar epistemic weight as her tes-
timony to have seen God. Indeed conceptual differences between percep-
tions of objects and colors, and aspect perceptions extend to epistemology. 
Let us look more closely at perceptions of beauty and at ethical percep-
tions before we tum to perceptions of God. 
Perceptions of beauty 
The person who believes that a certain movie, painting, or novel is beau-
tiful on the basis of her perception of their beauty can be said to have a 
good reason for her belief. However, a person who is not familiar with the 
item concerned has little reason to trust such a testimonv and believe that 
the item concerned is beautiful. " 
Our suspicion towards other people's testimonies of their perceptions of 
beauty is manifested in a variety of manners: we often disregard a critic's 
review, even a favorite critic's review and proceed to see the movie or buy 
the book; we do not allow our mothers to buy our clothes for us; we 
replace presents; if a generous friend offers to redecorate our house for us, 
we refuse; we do not trust a friend to pick out the most beautiful painting 
for us but we trust her to pick out a painting by its catalogue number. 
While it is unlikely that what another person had seen as a dog, T would 
have seen as an elephant, it is quite likely that what another person had 
found beautiful, I would have found kitsch, dull, boring, or unengaging. 
People's perceptions of beauty vary greatly; and this great variety under-
lies our inability to trust another person's perception of beauty. 
However, the issue is not merely of trust or mistrust of the reliability of 
another person's perception of beauty. It involves the logical features of the 
belief that a certain object is beautiful. The point is a grammatical one: one 
cannot be said to believe that an item is beautiful merely on the basis of 
another person's testimony. Believing that something is beautiful involves 
seeing its beauty for oneself. 
Thus, a reviewer who writes a review on the basis of other critics 
reviews, or on the basis of her friends' impressions cannot be taken seri-
ously. We would criticize her as neglectful. Our intuition is that she cannot 
evaluate the aesthetic features, the beauty, or excellence of a picture with-
out actually seeing it. Knowing that she has not seen the movie, we find 
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ourselves unable to take her statement that "The Green Mile is a beautiful 
movie" as an expression of a belief. 
Insisting that one cannot believe that a certain object is beautiful on the 
basis of another person's perception of the beauty of that object does not 
amount to a denial of the relevance of other people's ways of seeing for 
one's own beliefs and judgments. A friend's testimony may motivate me to 
buy a book, see a movie, or look again at a painting. It may even help me 
see beauty where I have previously failed to see it. However, the same testi-
mony that motivates me to buy the book or see the movie does not induce 
me to respond to the question "Is it a good movie?", or "Is it a good book?" 
with a simple "Yes". Rather, I would say, "I heard it was good", "x liked it", 
"It's supposed to be good". Another person's testimony provides me with a 
reason to attend to the object, to look, or look again. It provides me with a 
reason to believe that I may find it beautiful. However, as a matter of logic, 
it does not provide me with a reason to believe that it is beautiful. Believing 
that a certain object is beautiful involves seeing its beauty for oneself. 
Ethical perceptions 
Ethical judgments, too, involve seeing for oneself. In ethical matters, too, 
another person's belief, judgment, or advice, on their own, do not suffice as 
grounds or reasons for a belief or a judgment. We cannot dispense with the 
first person's perspective. 
Ethical deliberation can often be described in Swinburne's vocabulary of 
"seeming" as well as in perceptual terms. Let us take a classical example 
from Sartre. Sartre describes a young man facing a dilemma: should he join 
the French Resistance or should he look after his sick mother? Torn 
between two conflicting duties he finds it hard to make up his mind. One 
moment, he sees his mother at the center of the picture, and he perceives 
his duty to her as outweighing his duty to his country; the next, he sees his 
duty to his country at the center of the pichlre and as outweighing his duty 
to his mother. Pulled by two incompatible perceptions of the situation, 
which suggest two incompatible courses of action, the young man has to 
make a decision. 
There is an obvious sense in which the problem is the young man's 
problem-he has to act. However, Gaita and Rhees emphasize that there is 
a sense in which the very nature of the dilemma involves his way of per-
ceiving his options.'9 In this sense, as a matter of logic, no one could solve 
the young man's problem; no one could make a decision for him. The 
young man's problem is his problem and the solution, too, has to come 
from him. 
Rhees states: 
What J would regard as a reason might not be a reason for you-
might not function as a reason in your decisions. This is not trivial 
and you cannot brush it off by murmuring' relativism'. It is bound up 
with the whole point that the decision has to come from the person 
involved. Even the problem is hardly ever the same from one person 
to another. And what makes it the problem it is for me are the rea-
sons which weigh with me in one direction and in another. If in the 
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face of these reasons I conclude that I ought to give up my job anoth-
er man considering the same reasons might conclude differently. 
Perhaps I shall think that what he has decided is wrong. But I might 
not think this. It was his decision and-in an important sense-it was 
his problem.20 
Gaita emphasizes that moral deliberation is not simply deliberation 
with a moral subject matter. The differences between moral problems and 
other practical problems "are not external features of moral problems".21 
Thus: 
The fact that there can be no manual of morals, no theory of its prac-
tice which plays the same role as does mountaineering theory to 
mountaineering practice, no quiz show and no whiz kids of moral 
dilemmas, no Nobel Laureates in Morality, is intrinsic to our under-
standing of what it is to have a moral problem and what it is to think 
about it. We express it by saying that moral problems are personal.22 
This does not mean that another person's way of seeing is irrelevant for 
my moral deliberation nor does it exclude the possibility of moral advice. 
A friend's advice is an invitation to see things a certain way. She may chal-
lenge my way of seeing and through that, my belief concerning the right 
course of action to pursue. She may help me see the complexity in the situ-
ation. She may help me see the relevance of various issues that I had failed 
to consider. She may help me consider consequences and implications that 
I had failed to take into account. She may also help me come to a conclu-
sion. 
However, unlike a testimony to have perceived a red chair in the next 
room, which can be taken at face value as a reason to believe that there is a 
red chair in the next room, a friend's moral advice cannot be taken at face 
value and followed without further ado. Following a friend's moral advice 
without immersing myself in her way of seeing, without seriously consid-
ering it is itself a moral failure. A person's "doing the right thing" as a 
result of her following advice but without seeing its point, is missing some-
thing important about the situation's moral features. She might be doing 
the right thing but it is not obvious that she is doing the right thing for the 
right reason, nor is it obvious that she is doing the right thing in the right 
spirit. This may be manifested in the subtleties of her behavior, and may be 
apparent to sensitive eyes. "Doing the right thing" is not merely a matter of 
performing the right act. It involves my intention, the consequences of my 
act; it involves the manner in which I have reached my decision; it has to 
do with whether I have sought advice or not, with how I took the advice, 
whether I have seriously considered it, dismissed it without thinking, fol-
lowed it without consideration, or immersed myself in it in order to try to 
see its point. 
Thus, while "ethical testimony" plays a role in our moral lives in the 
form of moral advice, it plays a different role than the role of perceptual 
testimonies of colors, shapes, or the presence of objects and their arrange-
ment. While a testimony concerning the color of a certain object may be 
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taken at face value, trusted and believed, advice concerning the right 
course of action has to be taken in and made one's own, before one can be 
said to believe that the recommended course of action is the right one, 
before one can be said to have done the right thing. 
I have discussed two perceptual testimonies: perceptual testimonies of 
beauty and of the "right thing to do" in order to point out that some per-
ceptual testimonies, as a matter of logic, do not function as grounds, justifi-
cations, or reasons for the non-perceiver to hold the corresponding percep-
tual beliefs. While the perceiver's perceptual belief is prima facie justified, 
the non-perceiver cannot be justified merely by means of the perceiver's 
testimony of her perception. These examples suffice to show that 
Swinburne's Principle of Credulity, in its second explication, cannot be 
applied across the board to ordinary perceptions and aspect perceptions 
alike. I shall now say a few words about religious perceptions. 
Religious perceptions 
Seeing God, like the seeing of beauty, or of the "right thing to do" is 
conceptually distinguishable from seeing an ordinary object of perception. 
An interesting biblical passage describes a situation in which Eli and 
Samuel are within a hearing distance from one another, but only Samuel 
hears God speaking to him, while Eli does not: 
Eli ... was lying down in his own place; the lamp of God had not yet 
gone out, and Samuel was lying down within the temple of the Lord, 
where the ark of God was. Then the Lord called, 'Samuel! Samuel!" 
and he said "Here I am!" and ran to Eli, and said "Here I am for you 
called me". But he said "I did not call; lie down again." So he went 
and lay down. And the Lord called again, "Samuel!" and Samuel 
arose and went to Eli and said, "Here I am for you called me." But he 
said, "I did not call, my son; lie down again." Now Samuel did not 
yet know the Lord and the word of the Lord had not yet been 
revealed to him. And the Lord called Samuel again the third time. 
And he arose and went to Eli, and said, "Here I am, for you called 
me." Then Eli understood2:1 that the Lord was calling the boy. 
Therefore Eli said to Samuel, "Go, lie down; and if he calls you, you 
shall say, 'Speak, Lord, for thy servant hears.'" So Samuel went and 
lay down in his place (1 Samuel 3:2-9). 
This passage gives expression to the difference between hearing God and 
hearing the voice of another human being. While a human being's voice 
can be heard by anyone with normal hearing who is in sufficient proximity 
to the speaker, one hears God only if one is addressed. Wittgenstein 
emphasizes the same point in Zettel, saying: "'You can't hear God speak to 
someone else, you can hear him only if you are being addressed'.-That is 
a grammatical remark" (Z, 717). 
Wittgenstein's grammatical comment is, I believe, an affirmation of the 
non-transferability of testimonies of religious perceptions as grounds for 
belief in God's existence. Samuel's testimony to have heard God is neither 
a justification nor a reason for the atheist to believe that God exists, nor is it 
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a reason for the atheist to believe that God spoke to Samuel. Eli's realiza-
tion that it was God who was talking to Samuel does not obscure this 
point. After all, Eli, too, was a man of God. Eli was a prophet. Could we 
imagine a Freud realizing that it was God who was speaking to Samuel? 
God's command to Ezekiel to eat His Word can be seen as an attempt to 
bridge the conceptual gap between hearing God's Word and hearing the 
words of a human being: 
But you, son of man, hear what I say to you; be not rebellious like 
that rebellious house; open your mouth and eat what I give you ... 
Son of man, eat what is offered to you; eat this scroll, and go, speak to 
the house of Israel ... Son of man, go, get you to the house of Israel, 
and speak with my words to them (Ezekiel 2:8; 3:1,4).24 
Ezekiel's eating the Word of God is a way of narrowing the gap 
between Ezekiel's experience of God, and Israel's intended experience of 
God by means of their experience of Ezekiel. 
The non-transferability of religious testimony has to do with divergence 
and disagreement. While I have every reason to believe that had I been 
standing where Samuel was standing, when he was talking to Eli, that I, 
too, would have heard the voice of Eli, I have no reason to believe that had 
I been standing where Samuel was, when God was talking to him, that I, 
unlike Eli, would have been able to hear God. I have every reason to 
believe that had I been in Augustine's room when he heard the voice call-
ing "take, read" that I too would have heard that voice. However, I have 
no reason to think that like Augustine, I too would have heard that voice as 
a divine invitation. While I have every reason to believe that I too would 
have witnessed the thunder and lightning that frightened Luther, I have no 
reason to think that I, like Luther, would have been filled with a sense of 
divine forgiveness on that occasion. I have no reason to believe that had I 
been in the same room with Teresa of Avila or with St. John of the Cross, 
that I too would have had the same mystical experiences that each of them 
has had. Such divergence and disagreement underlie the reserve with 
which we treat people's reports of their experiences of God, whether we 
are believers or atheists. 
It is important to notice that trusting the mystic'S experience is not sim-
ply a matter of trusting a person's testimony concerning the features of an 
object that one was not in a position to observe. Rather, it is more like the 
case where one is asked to trust another person's testimony of her percep-
tion of an (aspect of) an object or situation that one did perceive, but per-
ceived differently, under a different aspect. The atheist is asked to mistrust 
her own perception of the world, and to trust the mystic'S way of perceiv-
ing the world. 
Both the mystic (theist) and the atheist inhabit the same world. They 
may be participating in the same battle, parenting the same sick child, 
looking at the same sky, or reading the same book. Unlike the mystic, the 
atheist does not see the world as revealing of God's design; she does not 
see the heavens telling the glory of God, nor does she see God in a cloud. 
She does not hear God speak to her in the verses of the bible. She does not 
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see floods and earthquakes as God's Will, nor does she see unexpected vic-
tories or recoveries as miracles. She sees cancer, madness and death as the 
marks of the meaninglessness and purposelessness of human existence. 
What reason does she have to trust the mystic's way of seeing the world 
when she sees a universe in disarray? What would it be like for her to trust 
the mystic's testimonies while she continues to see the world as she does? 
Calling her deprived, condemning her way of seeing the world as sinful or 
ungrateful, comparing her inability to see God to color blindness or to a 
lack of musical ear does not amount to a reason. 
There are various ways in which we deal with perceptual disagree-
ments: we examine the conditions under which each of the perceivers has 
had her experiences, and attempt to establish whether they are "normal"; 
we examine each of the perceivers, and attempt to establish whether they 
are "normal". We distinguish "normal" and "expert" perceivers from one 
another. By the employment of such means, we are usually able to recon-
cile disagreements concerning ordinary objects of perception. Thus, in dis-
agreements concerning the color of an object, we dismiss the perceptions of 
those who were under the influence of LSD; we dismiss the perceptions of 
those who are color blind. We reconcile disagreements about shape by dis-
missing the perceptions of those who are far sighted, as well as of those 
who were looking at the object when it was dark. In a dispute concerning 
whether a certain Whiskey has a sherry after-taste, we trust the wine 
taster's perception. 
However, disagreements concerning beauty, the moral value of a cer-
tain course of action, or God's existence are not ordinarily reconciled by 
appeal to "normal conditions", "normal perceivers' or "expert perceivers". 
We acknowledge some people as art connoisseurs. However, we do not 
recognize beauty experts, nor do we recognize moral experts. The atheist 
does not recognize the mystic as an expert perceiver of God. Given the fact 
that our ordinary means for resolving perceptual disagreements are of little 
use in ethical, aesthetic and religious disputes, what force does 
Swinburne's stipulative insistence that the atheist has a reason to trust the 
mystic's perception of God have? Should the person who does not see the 
beauty of a particular object also trust the person who testifies to her per-
ception of its beauty?25 Again, what would it be like for the atheist to trust 
the mystic'S perceptions if she continues to see a disordered universe with 
no judge and no justice? 
However, the epistemic disanalogy between ordinary perceptions and 
various aspect perceptions goes further than that. As in the ethical and aes-
thetic examples, here, too, this is not merely a matter of the trust or mis-
trust that another person's testimony warrants. Rather, it has to do with the 
very possibility of forming a belief on the basis of someone else's testimo-
ny. The issue is a conceptual/logical one. It is part of the very grammar of 
belief in God that one cannot be said to believe in God on the basis of some-
one else's experience of God. Believing in God necessarily involves seeing 
God for oneself. 
The great deal of divergence, the difficulty in distinguishing competent 
perceivers from incompetent ones, the non-transferability of perceptual 
testimonies as grounds for belief formation, and the role of the first per-
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son's perspective distinguish the epistemic status and function of percep-
tions of ethical, aesthetic and religious properties, from the epistemic status 
and function of perceptions of colors, shapes and objects. A plausible con-
ception of religious justification must take account of such differences. ln 
the next section, I shall develop a conception of religious justifications that 
takes account of such differences and argue that the performance of mira-
cles can be taken as the paradigm of religious justifications. 
II. Reasons and Miracles 
While a testimony to have perceived beauty, a certain course of action as 
morally right, or God cannot be taken at face value as a reason or ground 
for forming the corresponding belief, a testimony may be the occasion 
through which one comes to believe that a certain object is beautiful, that a 
certain course of action is morally desirable, or that God exists. The witness 
may become the mediator through which the non-perceiver comes to per-
ceive beauty, courage, or God. The witness' personality, tone of voice and 
gestures, her personal biography and way of life playas important a role as 
her verbal testimony in her ability to reason the non-perceiver into seeing. 
Sibley mentions seven types of reasons that are employed in aesthet-
ics, some of which have to do with the content of one's message (1-5), 
and others, with the manner in which it is conveyed (6-7). He mentions 
the following: 
1. Mentioning the non-aesthetic features of the work of art. 
Through that, the critic singles out what may serve as a key to 
grasping something new. 
2. Mentioning the very aesthetic qualities that the critic wishes 
others to see, e.g., gracefulness, and intensity. 
3. Linking the remarks about the aesthetic features to the non-
aesthetic features of the work of art. 
4. Using similes and metaphors. 
5. Using contrasts, comparisons, and reminiscences. 
6. Repeating and reiterating the same point that the critic wishes 
the hearer to notice. 
7. Accompanying the talk with appropriate tone of voice, expres-
sion, nods, looks and gestures.26 
Sibley emphasises that reasoning in aesthetics is different from reasoning 
in science: "We cannot prove by argument or by assembling a sufficiency 
of conditions that something is graceful; but this is no more puzzling than 
our inability to prove by using the methods metaphors and gestures of the 
art critic, that it will be made in ten moves."27 Aesthetic properties cannot 
be deduced from non-aesthetic ones. We cannot isolate a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions under which a certain fact is necessarily per-
ceived as beautiful, elegant, or graceful. 
Dancy makes a similar point in regards to ethics. He points out that 
moral reasoning is not subsumptive in nature, i.e., that it does not involve 
the subsumption of the particular case under certain general moral princi-
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pIes. He emphasises that moral reasons are particularist in nature: 
To justify one's choice is to give the reasons one sees for making it, 
and to give those reasons is just to layout how one sees the situation . 
. . In giving those reasons one is not arguing for one's way of seeing 
the situation. One is rather appealing to others to see it ( ... ) the way 
one sees it oneself, and the appeal consists in laying out that way as 
persuasively as one can. The persuasiveness here is the persuasive-
ness of narrative: an internal coherence in the account which compels 
assent. We succeed in our aim when our story sounds right. Moral 
justification is therefore not subsumptive in nature but narrative.28 
The particularist nature of ethical and aesthetic reasoning is not indicative 
of a certain deficiency in the rationality of these realms of discourse. The 
types of reasons that are ordinarily employed in ethics and aesthetics are 
precisely what reasons are like in ethics and aesthetics. In as much as deduc-
tive arguments are appropriate within mathematics and the use of a particu-
lar tone of voice is not, the latter is appropriate in aesthetics while deductive 
reasons are not. The type of reasoning that is characteristic of religious rea-
soning is also particularist in nature. Priests and ministers do not ordinarily 
use the argument from religious experience, nor do they use the ontological, 
cosmological, or teleological argument for God's existence when preaching 
the gospel. They tell a narrative, a parable, point to certain facts, perform cer-
tain acts. Arguments in ethics, aesthetics or religion do not consist of "assem-
bling a sufficiency of conditions that something is graceful"29, morally right, 
or sublime. Rather, they engage with the particular features of the event or 
object concerned, so that a new aspect may dawn. 
Dancy emphasises that in giving reasons one is appealing to others to 
see the situation as oneself does. Various aestheticians speak of reasons 
and arguments in aesthetics in similar terms. According to Sibley, reasons 
in aesthetics are intended to help one come to a new perception of the 
object.'u For Sibley, the critic's talk can help us "to see what he has seen, 
namely, the aesthetic qualities of the object."31 Isenberg describes the use of 
reasons in aesthetics as directed at inducing sameness of vision." Reasons, 
in aesthetics, do not bypass experience but try to transform it. The critic is a 
teacher who "affords new perceptions and with them new values"33; and 
understanding in aesthetics "is nothing but a second moment of aesthetic 
experience, a retrial of experienced values."34 
The witness' personality and biography play an important role in ethical 
and religious reasoning. Gaita emphasises that receiving moral advice is 
different from reading a proof for a theorem on the blackboard. TIle person 
giving the advice, her personal experiences, the seriousness with which she 
approaches the situation are all relevant to the manner in which I am to 
respond to her advice. Conversion, too, is not merely a matter of being 
given a valid argument. People, with bodies, histories, with the ability to 
feel happiness and pain playa great role in one's way to God. The person-
ality of the preacher, whether she is modest or arrogant, over-zealous or 
tolerant, whether the expression on her face is kind or impatient, the man-
ner in which she treats her partner, parents and children, how she answers 
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the telephone solicitor, her tone of voice, and way of gesturing are all rele-
vant in regards to her ability to reason her hearers into seeing God. While 
Einstein's sexual history is irrelevant for our evaluation of the Theory of 
Relativity, Jimmy Swaggart's sexual adventures are an impediment in his 
ability to reason many into accepting Jesus as Lord. 
Emotions play an important role in reasoning a person into aspect see-
ing. Gaita states: 
In matters of value we often learn by being moved, and our being 
moved is not merely the dramatic occasion of our introduction to a 
proposition which can be assessed according to critical categories, 
whose grammar excludes our being moved as extraneous to the 'cog-
nitive' content of the proposition.35 
Being moved is the very manner by which people are converted into a 
new ethical or religious perspective. Sentimentality, too, is evaluated dif-
ferently as a route to aspect seeing, as opposed to a route to belief in a sci-
entific theory. Gaita points out that while sentimentality is a cause for false 
propositions in biology, in ethics, sentimentality characterises the very 
thing that is wrong. In biology the cognitive content of a proposition can be 
identified independently of the emotions surrounding it. The style of pre-
sentation is irrelevant. Our evaluation of an ethical statement, on the other 
hand, takes account of how we have arrived at it, whether in anger, indif-
ference, or in compassion. Thus, our emotions are not incidental to the sta-
tus of our ethical judgements.36 
The same is true of religious reasoning. Emotions play an important role 
in coming to faith. People often come to God as a result of being moved by 
a near-death experience, by a powerful novel, by a death, a birth, a meeting 
that changed their life, by hearing a sermon, by falling in love. Seeing 
something as a miracle, seeing God in a particular event is also being 
moved in a particular way. How a person is moved, whether by fear, hate, 
love, or hope goes to the heart of how we judge her coming to see things 
differently, whether as a conversion, a delusional state, a mental sickness, 
or as manipulation. The types of emotions that playa role in one's change 
of heart are not incidental to its very nature. We think of a preacher who 
promises hell and damnation, who terrifies her hearers into believing, as 
manipulating them rather than as converting them. We no longer see fear 
as a reason for conversion but merely as a cause. Finding God by being 
brought to find hope, meaning, love, or courage, on the other hand, are 
ordinarily seen as genuine conversions. 
Acknowledging the role of the emotions in reasoning a person to aspect 
see God, beauty or a certain course of action as the right one does not 
amoW1t to a non-critical acceptance of all the means of persuasion that are 
used to convince and convert. The types of distinctions that we make 
between acceptable and unacceptable means of persuasion or conversion, 
complex as they are, can be accepted, as they are, and put into use by the 
philosopher. Using those distinctions as our starting point to an examina-
tion of the kinds of reasons that are employed within religious discourse is 
already delimiting reasons from manipulations. There is no need for an 
JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 515 
external criterion for separating reasons from manipulations within reli-
gious discourse. 
Margaret MacDonald's conception of aesthetic reasoning ties together 
various features of aesthetic argumentation around a per formative concep-
tion of aesthetic reasoning. Arguments and proofs in aesthetics do not 
"give general criteria as 'reasons' but 'convey' the work as a pianist might 
'show' the value of a sonata by playing it".'7 An argument in aesthetics, 
according to MacDonald, is a performance, which brings it to life; it is not 
merely a description of its character: 
Criticism does not, and cannot, have the impersonal character and 
strict rules, applicable independently of time and place, appropriate 
to science and mathematics .... Criticism is, therefore, I suggest, an 
indefinite set of devices for 'presenting' not 'proving' the merits of 
works of art. It has none of the stability of logical truth, scientific 
method, legal and moral law. It varies with time, place and audience, 
while not being completely subject to these limitations." 
Thus, For MacDonald, the tasks of the critic "resemble those of the actor 
and executant rather than those of the scientist and logician"." 
Preachers, too, do not ordinarily use deductive or inductive arguments. 
Like the art critic who re-performs the work of art so that it may come to 
life in a particular way, the preacher, too, intends to bring various facts or 
events, past or present, into life so that God may be seen in or through 
them. The preacher therefore plays a similar role to that of the actor and 
executant. 
Religious reasons and justifications, like ethical and aesthetic reasons 
and justifications, should not be construed on the model of scientific ones. 
When they are construed in general and abstract means, they are religious-
ly impotent. An examination of the types of reasons that are ordinarily 
employed in conversations between theists and atheists shows that reli-
gious reasoning, like ethical and aesthetic reasoning, is particularist, and 
like ethical and aesthetic reasoning, it is directed at inducing sameness of 
vision. Religious justification is not a mere deduction or induction but a 
demonstration, a performance. 
Miracles 
Another way of characterising a performative act through which God is 
seen is as a miracle. The term "miracle" is applied to any event, whether 
ordinary or extraordinary through which God is seen. An argument too, 
may be called a "miracle" when it becomes the vehicle through which God 
is seen. Thus, the performance of miracles, of demonstrative, transforma-
tive acts which are intended to help one see God is the paradigm of reli-
gious reasoning. 
Taking the performance of miracles as the paradigm of religious reason-
ing is compatible with the dominant role that the perception of miracles 
played, and continues to play in people's religious conversions. According 
to Ramsay MacMullen miracles, healing, and exorcism were the estab-
lished means of conversion in the ancient world. Conversion by means of 
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philosophical arguments was the exception rather than the rule.40 
Miracles were often used to argue for a particular religious point. Jesus 
performed miracles as a way of reasoning his fellow Jews into seeing his 
special relationship to God. In Mark 2, we hear of the healing of a paralytic. 
Upon seeing the paralytic, Jesus said: "Son, your sins are forgiven." The 
narrative continues: 
Now some of the scribes were sitting there questioning in their hearts, 
'Why does this fellow speak in this way? It is blasphemy! Who can 
forgive sins but God alone?' At once Jesus perceived in his spirit that 
they were discussing these questions among themselves; and he said 
to them, iWhy do you raise such questions in your hearts? Which is 
easier, to say to the paralytic, 'Your sins are forgiven' or to say iStand 
up and take your mat and walk?' but so that you may know that the 
Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins" -he said to the par-
alytic-'I say to you, stand up, take your mat and go to your home'. 
And he stood up, and immediately took the mat and went out before 
all of them; so that they were all amazed and glorified God, saying, 
'We have never seen anything like this!' (Mark 2: 8-12). 
In this passage, Jesus used a miracle to demonstrate his special relation to 
God and his authority to forgive sins. He used a miracle as an argument. 
Its purpose was to transform his audience's perception of him, to help 
them see him in a new light: as one whose relation to God is such that he 
can forgive sins. 
We must not be misled into thinking that a miracle is different from any 
other form of argumentation or reasoning in religion, in putting an end to 
the disagreement and forcing itself on its perceivers. Like other types of 
argumentation in religion, a miracle too has to be perceived in a particular 
way. God has to be seen acting in the event in as much as God has to be 
seen or heard in the words of the preacher, in her pointing to an unexpect-
ed victory, recovery, to the sun, or the rain. 
Our inability to deduce the religious from the non-religious is manifest-
ed in the multiplicity of reactions to biblical, as well as to non-biblical mira-
cles. We hear of a variety of reactions to Jesus' miracles. In Luke 11, we 
hear of Jesus casting out demons. While some marvelled, others accused 
him of casting out demons by the evil power Be-el' -zebul: 
Now he was casting out a demon that was dumb; when the demon 
had gone out, the dumb man spoke, and the people marvelled. But 
some of them said, 'He casts out demons by Be-el' -zebul, the prince 
of demons'; while others, to test him, sought from him a sign from 
heaven. (Luke 11: 14-16). 
The gospel according to John tells us of a variety of reactions to Jesus' 
healing of the blind man: 
The neighbours and those who had seen ... [the blind man] before as 
a beggar began to ask 'Is this not the man who used to sit and beg?' 
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Some were saying 'It is he.' Others were saying 'No, but it is someone 
like him.'" (John 9: 8-9). After establishing that it was the blind man 
who has been healed by Jesus and can now see, the Pharisees, hear-
ing that the healing has taken place on a Sabbath said 'This man is 
not from God, for he does not observe the Sabbath.' But others said 
'How can a man who is a sinner perform such sign?' And they were 
divided. (John 9: 16). 
Reasons and demonstrations in religion are surrounded by disagree-
ment, by a variety of responses. What functions as a reason for one, does 
not fW1ction as a reason for another; what moves one into faith does not 
move the other; what impresses one person as a demonstration, what one 
person is able to see as revealing of God's presence or very being is not 
seen as such by another. Where one person sees God another sees a hap-
penstance; where one sees a punishment another sees a misfortune. 
The working of miracles with the disagreement and doubt that surround 
them is the paradigm of reasoning in religion. Like a miracle, an argwnent in 
religion is a demonstration, a performance which is designed to bring vari-
ous facts or events into life in a particular manner, so that God may be seen 
in or through them, through the performer or through her performance. Like 
a miracle, an argwnent is a vehicle through which God may be seen. 
Assimilating the giving of a reason for God's existence to the perfor-
mance of a miracle that is designed to reveal God's existence does not com-
mit us to a contentious conception of God as a super-cause, nor does it 
commit us to a conception of miracles as violations of the laws of nature. 
Swinburne's definition of a miracle: "An event of an extraordinary kind 
brought about by a god and of religious significance"41 need not be accept-
ed. Such a conception of a miracle obscures what is most important about a 
miracle, namely, that it is a medium through which God is seen. Any fact 
or event, of whatever kind: ordinary, or extraordinary, predictable or 
unpredictable, one that appears to violate the laws of nature, or one that is 
in complete agreement with our understanding of the laws of nature could 
become the vehicle through which God is seen, i.e., a miracle. 
Being extraordinary, appearing to violate the laws of nature is neither a 
sufficient condition nor a necessary one for an event to be called a "miracle." 
Swinburne himself points out that: "If a god intervened in the natural order 
to make a feather land here rather than there ... or to upset a child's box of 
toys ... these events would not naturally be described as miracles."42 God is 
not necessarily seen in the inexplicable, in the abnormal and deviant. A baby 
born with two heads is not ordinarily seen as a miracle. Extraordinary events 
that serve a positive purpose, too, are not necessarily seen as miracles. The 
multiplicity of reactions to biblical miracles reveals the fact that extra-ordi-
nariness is not a sufficient condition. The Pharisees did not see God in the 
healing of the paralytic; the Egyptians did not see the God of Israel in the 
Plagues. An atheist could always regard an event, which appears to violate 
the laws of nature as inexplicable, but as revealing of nothing but itself. 
It is the seeing of God in an event that leads one to apply the term "mira-
cle" to that event. The religiously sighted is able to see God not merely in 
the extraordinary and unexpected, but also in the ordinary, in what is 
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expected, even in the banal. Thus, extra-ordinariness is not a necessary con-
dition either for our application of the term "miracle" to an event. Any vehi-
cle through which God is perceived may be called a miracle. Any object, 
fact or event may become the vehicle through which God is perceived: 
whether it is an argument, a frog, a burning bush, or an unexpected healing. 
The biblical conception of "miracles" is explicated in the terminology of 
"signs and wonders."43 "Signs and wonders" are facts or events through 
which God is seen. Some such events are extraordinary, while others are 
completely ordinary. Some such events could be described by the post 
enlightenment terminology of apparent violations to the laws of nature, 
while others can be described as the very paradigm of our conception of a 
law of nature. 
The rainbow is described as a sign of God's covenant: 
This is the sign of the covenant which I make between me and you 
and every living creature that is with you, for all future generations: J 
set my bow in the cloud, and it shall be a sign of the covenant 
between me and the earth. (Genesis 9: 12-13). 
The believer sees God's covenant with the universe in the rainbow. The 
rainbow is a sign of God's presence in the world. 
The same term, "sign", is used to refer to the Plagues: 
Then the Lord said to Moses, 'Go in to Pharaoh; for I have hardened 
his heart and the heart of his servants, that I may show these signs of 
mine among them, and that you may tell in the hearing of your son 
and of your son's son how I have made sport of the Egyptians and 
what signs I have done among them; that you may know that J am 
the Lord.' (Exodus 10: 1-2). 
God is perceived in darkness, in the sickness of the enemy's cattle, in hail 
and in lice, to mention only few such signs. 
In Psalm 107, the Psalmist thanks God for the wonders that God had 
performed. The list of wonders includes events that appear to violate our 
conception of the laws of nature but also events that have a great impor-
tance to the one who has experienced them, but that appear to fall into the 
domain of the ordinary rather than the extraordinary. The Psalm mentions: 
turning rivers into deserts, turning a fruitful land into a salty waste, but 
also deliverance from hunger and thirst, and deliverance from affliction 
(Psalm 107: 4-5, 33-34). 
Jewish and Christian theologians, too, do not restrict the application of 
the term "miracle" to that which appears to violate the natural course of 
events, or the laws of nature. 
Nahmanides, one of the most influential rabbinical leaders in 12th cenhl-
ry Spain, spoke of both public miracles and of secret miracles, which are 
hidden in their ordinariness: 
The rewards and punishments of the Torah are all secret miracles, 
which appear to those who see them as belonging to the normal 
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course of the world, although the truth is that they are punishments 
and rewards for human beings.44 
According to Nahmanides, everything is a miracle: 
Out of the experience of the great public miracles a person will come 
to acknowledge the secret miracles, which are the foundation (yesod) 
of the entire Torah. For no one has a portion in the Torah of Moses 
our master unless he believes that everything that happens to us (klwl 
devareinu u-miqreinu), everything, is a miracle. There is nothing natur-
al or ordinary about it ... 45 
For Nahmanides, there is no ontological distinction between public and 
hidden miracles, between the ordinary and the extraordinary. God is in 
everything, and God may be seen in everything. 
Tillich, eight hundred years later wished to do away with the supernat-
ural undercurrents of the term "miracle", and re-emphasise the original 
biblical sense of miracles as signs through which God is seen, or in his ter-
minology, "sign-events" that produce astonishment: 
Miracles cannot be interpreted in terms of a supernatural interference 
in natural processes .... The supernaturalistic theory of miracles 
makes God a sorcerer . . . A genuine miracle is first of all an event 
which is astonishing, unusual, shaking, without contradicting the 
rational structure of reality. In the second place, it is an event which 
points to the mystery of being, expressing its relation to us in a defi-
nite way. In the third place, it is an occurrence which is received as a 
sign-event in an ecstatic experience. Only if these three conditions are 
fulfilled can one speak of a genuine miracle.4h 
People apply the term "miracle" to an unexpected recovery, to a meet-
ing that changed their life, to a "miracle drug" that kills decease or that 
reduces pain. Any event that impresses one, that moves one, that plays an 
important role in one's life, whether it is a birth, a death, a recovery, a con-
versation that changed one's life, a smile or a frown that tilted one's life in 
a particular direction, any event such as these may become the vehicle 
through which God is seen acting in one's life, i.e., a miracle. 
All attempt to prove God's existence by means of an argument is logically 
similar to the attempt to perform a miracle. Both attempts are directed at 
changing one's way of seeing; both are directed at helping one see God. An 
argument that brings about the dawning of the religious aspect, that 
becomes the medium through which one sees God may properly be called a 
"miracle". 
Testimony of God's Word, of God's nature and very being, whether of a 
prophet, a mystic, or an ordinary believer is often rejected. The non-per-
ceiver is often unable to see God by means of a testimony. It is only when 
the testimony becomes one's own, it is only when the witness and her testi-
mony become the vehicles through which God is seen, that one can be said 
to trust it, and believe. 
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Philosophers of religion often wish to perform miracles. They often wish 
to provide the atheist with reasons for believing. The argument from reli-
gious experience is one such attempt. The means that it employs, however, 
are such that its success would be nothing short of a miracleY 
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